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The role of the imagination in Virginia
Woolf’s short fiction
Elke D’hoker
1 The early decades of the twentieth century, the period in which Virginia Woolf started
writing her short fiction, have often been called the heydays of the British short story.
Only in the 1880’s had the British short story come into its own, and in the subsequent
decades, writing short fiction became a fashionable and even fairly lucrative pursuit. As
several critics have noted, the early twentieth century was also marked by a “wave of
experimentalism in British short fiction” (Benzel and Hoberman 3) and Woolf’s short
stories have often been read in terms of these narrative experiments.  Because of the
development of mass readership and the changed context of publishing, authorship too
underwent significant changes around the turn of the century and, with the advent of
modernism, so did the conception of literature and art. It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that the short story provided a suitable medium for reflection on the changing
nature of art and the artist (Maunders x). While these themes are perhaps most famously
explored in the short fiction of Henry James and James Joyce, several of Woolf’s short
stories  too  stage  meta-fictional  concerns.  Indirect  evidence  of  the  theoretical
preoccupations in some of Woolf’s short stories can be found in the way critics have often
interpreted  these  stories  in  the  context  of  her  essays  (cf.  Baldwin  21f.,  Head  81f.).
Moreover, as Susan Dick notes in her introduction to Woolf’s collected shorter fiction,
“the line separating Virginia Woolf’s fiction from her essays is a very fine one” (2) and
stories such as “Memoirs of Novelist” or “Three Pictures” cross the boundaries between
essay, sketch and story.
2 In this essay I propose to investigate in more detail the meta-fictional properties of a
handful of Woolf’s short stories, focusing in particular on their exploration of the role
and function of imagination. In the short stories as in the essays the imagination is a key
term in Woolf’s aesthetics. In “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown”, Woolf claims defiantly that
a character should be a product not “of freehold villas and copyhold estates”, but rather
“of imagination” (1968: 333). In “The Art of Biography” it is the artistic imagination which
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ultimately separates biography from art proper (1967: 225f.) and in “Modern Fiction” the
“creative power” of the imagination is a crucial factor in the attempt to forge a more
truthful  representation of  “life  itself” (1966:  107-8).  On the other hand,  short  stories
which foreground, question or dramatize the role of the imagination in both art and life
can be found throughout Woolf’s career: from “Memoirs of a novelist” and “The Mark on
the Wall” over “Sympathy” and “An Unwritten Novel” to “Moments of Being”, “The Lady
in the Looking-Glass” and “Three Pictures”. 
3 In  the  existing  criticism of  Woolf’s  short  fiction  her  staging  of  the  problem of  the
imagination is often read in terms of the irresolvable tension between binary opposites.
Thus Joanne Trautman Banks calls central to Woolf’s aesthetics such oppositions as “art
and life, appearance and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, the self and the not-self,
vision and fact” (18) and in an insightful discussion of “The Lady in the Looking-Glass”,
Julia Briggs similarly detects a “series of binary opposites: life and art; room and garden;
inside and outside;  words and pictures;  imagination and reality;  change and stillness;
light and shadow” (176). While the tension between the two poles in these oppositions is
of course ultimately irresolvable, I will nevertheless try to pin down Woolf’s position with
regard to the imagination in a somewhat more precise way. What part of the binaries
does Woolf privilege in her stories: reality or the imagination, the self or the other, art or
life?  What  does  Woolf’s  short  fiction  reveal  about  the  power  and  the  limits  of  the
imaginative  faculty?  What  does  it  tell  us  about  the  methods  and  tools  the  artistic
imagination wields? And what is the ethical dimension of the sympathetic imagination as
Woolf sees it? These are some of the questions which I will hope to answer in this essay.
 
Imagination as the artist’s tool
4 One of the first stories in which the issue of the imagination is centrally addressed is
“Memoirs of a Novelist”. It is one of Woolf’s so-called early stories which combine several
different genres: “nineteenth-century biography, the journal, the essay, and the review”
(Snaith 127). In this short work, the unnamed narrator comically criticises Miss Linsett’s
biography of  the  (fictional)  Victorian  lady  novelist  Miss  Willatt.  This  biography,  the
narrator  argues,  sadly  fails  to  bring its  subject  to  life  due to  a  mixture of  “nervous
prudery”, “dreary literary conventions” (Woolf 2003: 67) and, as Dean Baldwin has put it,
“a failure of imagination” (11). Exasperated by the excess of useless circumstantial fact in
the biography and by the lack of true insight in Miss Willatt’s personality, the narrator
then  sets  about  providing  an  alternative  biography,  one  geared  towards  the  inner
consciousness of both the novelist and her biographer. On the basis of tiny but telling
remarks in letters and novels, the narrator imagines an inner life for Miss Willatt which
gives the lie to the blameless stone effigy Miss Linsett fashioned for her. Though her
speculations are at first quite modestly introduced by small phrases such as “(if we may
theorise)” (63), “we can imagine” (65), “we can only guess” (66) or “one believes” (67),
they quickly give way to bold statements about the characters’ ‘true’ motivations, regrets,
secret hopes and dreams. In this way, the narrator does succeed where Miss Linsett failed:
Miss  Willatt  becomes  a  ‘real’  person  whose  inner  life  is  convincingly  illuminated.
“Memoirs of a Novelist” thus offers – in part – a plea for the imagination as the artist’s
tool needed to truly express “the spirit we live by, life itself”, as Woolf put it in “Mr.
Bennett and Mrs. Brown” (1968: 337). 
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5 A similar celebration of the imagination can be found in “The Mark on the Wall”, though
the imagination is here directed towards an object rather than a person. That the lengthy
imaginative speculations which the narrator engages in upon seeing a mark on the wall,
are ultimately proven wrong is largely irrelevant: a mere fact which interrupts the far
more fascinating work of the imagination. Interestingly, both “Memoirs of a Novelist”
and “The Mark on the Wall” refer in a small remark to one of the driving forces behind
Woolf’s fiction: the curiosity about other human beings. In the first story, the narrator
wistfully  talks  about  “all  these  people”  who  “come  to  life  again”  and  “tempt  us
intolerably to know more about them” (72). And even though the facts of their lives are
“irrecoverably” lost,  their personality can be revived in fiction. In “The Mark on the
Wall”, on the other hand, the narrator first introduces a motif which will be explored
again and again in Woolf’s  short  fiction,  that  of  the people who “face each other in
omnibuses and underground railways” who inspire the artist with an insatiable curiosity
as to the lives lived behind the “mirror” (79). 
6 This motif is explored in greater detail in the well-known essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs.
Brown” where Woolf calls this curiosity the central driving force of her writing.  She
explains how, for her, a novel seems to originate in “the figure of a man, or of a woman,
who said  ‘My name is  Brown.  Catch me if  you can” (1968:  319).  Woolf  then further
explores the idea of a nameless woman in a train carriage whose very expression invites
the observer/narrator to imagine a life for her. Since the essay is centrally concerned
with the opposition between the obsolete and ineffective “Edwardian” conventions for
writing and the quest of the “Georgian” writers for new forms and fictions, the imagined
life of Mrs. Brown takes the form not of a series of material details but of little scenes in
which the narrator “sees the person … sees Mrs. Brown” (322).  What is important to
Woolf here, as in “Memoirs of a Novelist” and “The Mark on the Wall”, are not the facts of
a life, but the artist’s “vision” of a life – and, by extension, of “life” in general (325). And
the imagination has a central role to play in the creation of this vision. 
7 The artistic attempt to imaginatively perceive the inner life of other human beings also
inspires three other short stories in Woolf’s oeuvre: “An Unwritten Novel”, “Moments of
Beings: ‘Slater’s Pins Have No Points’” and “The Lady in the Looking-Glass. A Reflection”.
Dominic Head calls these three stories the “Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown stories” (81),
because they are driven by the same ‘catch-me-if-you-can-demon’ which Woolf explores
in  the  essay  of  that  title.  Characteristic  of  all  three  stories,  moreover,  is  that  the
imaginative quest for the “true” personality of the character is at the end of the story
checked--and reverse--by the “facts” of reality. The stories all end with an alternative
scene which may--or may not--be more accurate than the first one. In all three stories, in
other words, the imagination comes up against its own limits. Yet a careful reading of the
stories shows that the limits of the imagination are already evident within the richness of
the narrator’s initial visions, suggesting a failure or lack at the heart of the imaginative
faculty itself. In spite of the obvious similarities between all three stories, moreover, each
story spells out the limitations of the imagination in a slightly different way.  In what
follows, therefore, I will discuss each of the Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown stories in terms
of a different failing of the imagination, even though cross-references will also make the
links between them apparent. 
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The limits of the imagination
8 The setting of “An Unwritten Novel” most closely resembles the anecdote of “Mr. Bennett
and  Mrs.  Brown”  as  the  narrator  finds  herself  challenged  into  storytelling  by  the
“expression of unhappiness” on a woman’s face in a railway carriage (106). She then sets
out to “read” that expression, to “see” the life behind it. It is indeed the very “life, soul,
spirit” (111) of “Minnie Marsh” which the narrator is interested in and both reading and
perceiving are foregrounded as activities in her attempt to imaginatively capture that
life.  “I  read  her  message,  deciphered  her  secret,  reading  it  beneath  her  gaze”,  the
narrator claims (108). And frequently she describes scenes as though literally “seeing”
them. The narrator thus imagines for Minnie Marsh a contemptuous sister-in-law she is
going to visit,  an unspecified crime she committed in the past,  an ailing mother she
nursed faithfully for many years and a lurid travelling salesman she has to confront at
her brother’s house. Even though the narrator claims that all this unhappiness is “life’s
fault. Life imposes her laws; life blocks the way” (112), to the reader it is much more the
conventions of sentimental fiction which seem to determine Minnie’s life. Indeed, as Dean
Baldwin has noted, the narrator’s “deciphering takes the form of clichés from popular
fiction” (22). Far from being original and true, in other words, the narrator’s imagination
is heavily determined by existing literary stereotypes and conventions.  This is finally
confirmed by the sudden appearance of the woman’s son which disproves the narrator’s
entire story, ironically at the exact point when she claims “I’ve read you right – I’m with
you now” (115). In “Three Pictures”, one of Woolf’s later stories, this tendency of the
imagination  to  be  bound  and  determined  by  preconceived  ideas  and  stereotypes  is
explicitly commented on: “[I]t is impossible that one should not see pictures […] We can
not possibly break out of the frame of the picture by speaking natural words” (222). If
these pictures take an explicitly social form in that story – “if my father was a blacksmith
and yours was a peer of the realm, we must needs be pictures to each other” (222), in “An
Unwritten  Novel”,  the  far  more  general  nature  of  these  pictures  and  stereotypes  is
demonstrated. They inevitably shape our interpretation, our ‘reading’, of other people,
thus effectively curbing the powers and possibilities of the imagination. 
9 “Moments of Being: ‘Slater’s Pins Have No Points’” is another story about the imaginative
‘reading’ of another person. The exercise is brought about here not by an unhappy look,
but by an unexpected remark. Miss Craye’s remark about Slater’s pins brings home to her
pupil, Fanny Wilmot, the realisation that her piano teacher has an ordinary life too. This
leads her to an imaginative (re-)construction of that life on the basis of a few stray facts
and  remarks.  “Around  these”,  as  Baldwin  has  put  it,  “Miss  Wilmot  spins  imaginary
incidents of courtship and proposals spurned, and of a life given meaning by Miss Craye’s
battles against the headaches that have plagued her for years” (53). A closer look at the
text  reveals  some  of  the  workings  of  Fanny’s  imagination  as  she  effectively  reads
significance  into some  remarks  of  Miss  Craye,  ever  so  slightly  altering  them in  the
process. Thus a remark of Miss Craye about men – “It’s the use of men, surely, to protect
us”  –  is  recalled  in  three  different  ways.  In  the  first  recording,  Miss  Craye  says  it
“smilingly” (211). Subsequently, Fanny meaningfully changes the remark into “It was the
only use of men, she had said” (211, italics mine) and in the final instance, Miss Craye
delivers the remark “with a queer, wry acerbity” (211). In a similar way, another of Miss
Craye’s  remarks about men – “they’re ogres” – is  first  recounted as being said “half
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laughing” and later on as “laughing grimly” (213).  One could indeed,  as Fanny notes
elsewhere, “make that yield what one liked” (212). 
10 These and other half-deliberate misreadings betray Fanny’s strong personal investment
in the scenes she imagines for Miss Craye.  Several  other details  further confirm this
impression. When Fanny imagines Miss Craye’s desire “to break the pane of glass which
separated them from other people” (210), this reflects in fact her own desire to break
through the reserved front of her piano teacher and to penetrate the person behind it.
Similarly, Fanny’s reading of Julia Craye as a strong, independent woman who turns down
a suitor so as not to “sacrifice” her freedom (212-13) recalls Fanny’s earlier remark that
she  doesn’t  “want  protection  [from  men]”  (211).  Finally,  the  mixture  of  desire  and
frustration, of wanting and not getting it which Fanny ascribes to Miss Craye might again
simply be a projection of her own half-conscious longings. This is also the conclusion
which Annette Oxindine reaches in her reading of the lesbian dimension of this story.
“Suspecting Julia’s lesbianism,” she argues, “Fanny is able to project onto her teacher all
the frustration and desire she has been unable to acknowledge as her own” (54).1 For
Oxindine,  the  story  is  thus  much more  about  “Fanny’s  discovery  of  her  own sexual
feelings for another woman”, than about Julia Craye’s own lesbianism (54). 
11 To return to the question of the imagination, it is clear that the inner life which Fanny
fashions for Julia Craye is very much determined by her own thoughts and feelings. The
imagination is thus again shown in its limitations, bound as it is by the personality of the
one  who  imagines.  In  fact,  the  narrative  set-up  of  “Moments  of  Being”  lends  itself
particularly well to the exploration of the subjectivity of the imagination. Unlike “An
Unwritten Novel” and “The Lady in the Looking Glass”,  this  story is  narrated by an
omniscient narrator who focalises through Fanny and is thus able to reveal more of the
personality of the creator than is possible in the first-person narratives. Moreover, the
omniscient  narrator  takes  over  at  crucial  moments,  for  instance  to  mark  the  final
surprise reversal which – as in “An Unwritten Novel” – further confirms the inevitable
imperfections of the imagination. 
12 “The Lady in the Looking-Glass” is the last of Woolf’s stories centrally concerned with the
possibility of truly knowing another human being. In this story, the ‘other’ is no (half)
stranger, but an intimate friend of the narrator. The narrator is left alone in the drawing
room while her friend, Isabella Tyson, has gone out in the garden to cut flowers. As the
narrator is pondering the strange opposition between the reality around her and the life
reflected in the large mirror hanging in the hall, she comes to realise how little she really
knows about her friend: “it was strange that after knowing her all these years one could
not  say what  the truth about  Isabella  was”  (216).  There are  some facts,  but  no real
knowledge of Isabella’s inner being: “[i]t was absurd, it was monstrous. If she concealed
so much and knew so much one must prize her open with the first tool that came to hand
– the imagination” (217).  The narrator then starts  a  rich train of  speculations about
Isabella’s  innermost  thoughts  about  life  and  death,  happiness  and  regret.  She  also
fancifully compares Isabella to the elegant, fantastic flowers she is cutting and she likens
Isabella’s thoughts to the dancing light in the drawing room. Yet the narrator realises at
the same time that the metaphors will not do, “for they come like the convolvulus itself
trembling  between  one’s  eyes  and  the  truth”  (216).  As  in  the  other  stories,  the
speculations are finally proven void when, in a final reversal, Isabella is revealed to be
“perfectly empty” and to have “no thoughts” at all (219). If this is the truth – and I will
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come back to that question later on – it is a rather negative kind of truth which does not
reveal much about Isabella’s inner self either. 
13 The story thus addresses the fundamental difficulty of ever fully knowing the intimate
self or inner life of another human being. Isabella cannot wholly be known through fancy
or metaphor – and perhaps not even through art. Once again, the imagination comes up
against  its  limits  here.  This  is  also  suggested  in  the  story  “Sympathy”  where  the
narrator’s imagination is stirred upon reading the death-notice of her friend’s husband in
the morning paper. She claims to “see” the death-bed, the widow’s grief and even the
dead  man  himself.  Yet  she  stops  short  of  imagining  her  friend’s  first,  crucial
confrontation with her dead husband: “There is a moment I can’t fancy: the moment in
other people’s lives that one always leaves out; the moment from which all that we know
them by proceeds; I follow her to his door; I see her turn the handle, then comes the blind
moment and when my fancy opens its eyes again I find her equipped for the world – a
widow” (102). These stories thus draw out a third failing of the imagination: its inability
to penetrate the innermost self of another human being. 
 
Art and the Imagination
14 The three stories discussed here seem to have a similar outline: a train of speculative
thought about another person is cut short by a final reversal. Dean Baldwin, however,
traces a crucial difference between them, when he discusses the closing scene of “The
Lady in the Looking-Glass” as follows: 
We have here the only story in which the narrator is able to pierce the barrier of
external reality and discover something essential  about her subject.  Why is this
narrator able to succeed where Fanny Wilmot and the narrator of “An Unwritten
Novel” were not? The answer is the mirror, for it does more than reflect; it also
composes and holds. (56)
15 In order to assess this difference between the stories, it is necessary to further investigate
the final paragraphs of all  three stories,  which describe the famous reversal scene in
which the imaginative speculations of the narrator or focaliser are proven wrong. In “An
Unwritten Novel”,  the narrator watches aghast as “her” Minnie walks away with her
loving son. At the same time, this scene “floods her anew”, and to an even greater degree
as she jubilantly embraces her mysterious fellow creatures: “If I fall on my knees, if I go
through the ritual, the ancient antics, it’s you, unknown figures, you I adore; if I open my
arms, it’s you I embrace, you I draw to me – adorable world!” (115). 
16 Another, more literal, embrace can be found in “Moments of Being” when an ecstatic
Miss Craye disproves Fanny’s speculations about loneliness and suddenly embraces her
pupil.  Again,  this  leads  Fanny to  experience a  sudden vision in which “[A]ll  seemed
transparent for a moment” and she really sees Julia. The word “saw” effectively becomes a
mantra in the final paragraphs; it is repeated no less than ten times: “She saw Julia open
her arms; saw her blaze; saw her kindle. Out of the night she burnt like a dead white star”
(214). In “The Lady in the Looking-Glass”, finally, the narrator similarly sees Isabella at
last, but this time as a reflection in the mirror: “At once the looking-glass began to pour
over  her  a  light  that  seemed to  fix  her;  that  seemed like  some acid  to  bite  off  the
unessential and superficial and to leave only the truth. It was an enthralling spectacle”
(219). When considering these final scenes, the inevitable question is of course whether
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the “truth” has indeed been grasped: whether the inner self of M.M., Julia and Isabella has
actually been penetrated and their life or soul finally been revealed.
17 First, it should be evident that the mere placing of these scenes at the end of the stories
ensures that they cannot in turn be contradicted. The story closes on this revelatory
moment and thus precludes dissent. It is important to note, moreover, that the “truth” is
in all three cases arrived at in a brief, sudden and heightened moment of revelation. The
endings are all “moments of being”, to use Woolf’s terminology, but also--and perhaps
even more so--moments of  seeing:  Joycean epiphanies,  yielding a  special  insight  or a
newly-discovered significance. As in the Joycean epiphany, moreover, ordinary reality is
transcended in these moments and the moment achieves the perfection and timelessness
of art. In “The Lady in the Looking-Glass” this artistic transformation is made explicit
through the image of the mirror, but in the other stories too, the revelatory moment
transforms reality into art. As a result, the referential aspect has ceased to matter.2 It has
become irrelevant whether M.M. or Julia are really happy, or whether it is at all possible
for a person to be so empty of thoughts. With art’s fixing, composing and transcending
gestures, another truth has taken over – a truth which replaces the potentiality of the
imagination with the timeless intensity of achieved art.
 
Ethics and the imagination
18 Yet art is, in fact, but a partial concern of these stories. It is only in the final paragraphs
of each story that a momentary vision achieves the transcendent quality of art. The rest
of the stories is very much set in ordinary reality and is concerned with the reading of
and  dealing  with  other  people  in  everyday  life.  The  evident  importance  of  the
imagination  in  these  interpersonal  activities  leads  one  to  wonder  about  the  ethical
dimension of the imagination in Woolf’s short fiction. Surprisingly, however, this topic
has so far received but little attention on the part of Woolf critics. In a fairly complex
difficult philosophical discussion of “it” in Woolf’s short fictions, Anne Besnault-Levita
does explore what she calls “the ethics of Virginia Woolf’s poetics of the implicit” (135)
and in her essay on Woolf’s short fiction, Joanne Trautman Banks argues cryptically that
“Woolf  investigates  the  imagination  as  a  tool  for  knowing,  unifying,  and  finally
transcending its environment through love” (18). Yet, on the whole, the ethical or moral
dimension of Woolf’s short stories has not really been a well-researched topic in the
existing criticism, due perhaps to the virtual absence of explicit references to ethics or
morality  in  the  stories  themselves.  Nevertheless,  I  believe  that  the  contemporary
theoretical debate about ethical criticism or the ethics of reading can shed some further
light on the role of the imagination in Woolf’s short stories. 
19 If we consider the ethical value of the imaginative faculty in Woolf’s stories, a first thing
that becomes evident is that the imagination is, on the whole, a positive force. It speaks of
a genuine interest in other people which is opposed to the deadening interest in the
“material” of Mr. Bennett and his fellow novelists (Woolf 1966: 104-5).3 In several stories,
secondly, the imagination is revealed to be a sympathetic imagination, which allows for a
fellow-feeling, an embracing of a shared humanity. Thirdly, a few stories also show how
the  sympathetic  imagination  works  through  identification.  In  the  “The  Lady  in  the
Looking-Glass”,  for instance,  the narrator – resolved to truly know Isabella – decides
“[o]ne must put oneself in her shoes” (218). And in “An Unwritten Novel”, the narrator
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identifies with the suffering of the poor woman opposite to such an extent that she takes
over the woman’s habits of twitching and rubbing the glass: 
Something impelled me to take my glove and rub my window. There, too, was a
little speck on the glass. For all my rubbing it remained. And then the spasm went
through me; I crooked my arm and plucked at the middle of my back. My skin, too,
felt like the damp chicken’s skin in the poulterer’s shop-window […] Leaning back
in my corner, shielding my eyes from her eyes, seeing only the slopes and hollows,
greys and purples, of the winter’s landscape, I read her message, deciphered her
secret, reading it beneath her gaze. (107-8)
20 The ethical or moral qualities which Woolf thus seems to attribute to the imagination
correspond with Martha Nussbaum’s take on the sympathetic imagination.4 In books such
as Love’s Knowledge (1990) and Poetic Justice (1990) Nussbaum offers an extended plea for
the value of the narrative imagination in ethical behaviour. In the essay “Exactly and
Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism”, she further defends these claims against a
number  of  opponents.  There  she  argues  again  for  the  powerful  moral  force  the
imagination presents, both because of its “cognitive role” “in bringing us into contact
with the complexity of our own lives and the lives of others” (348) and because of its
compassionate dimension, which allows us to emotionally share the plight of our fellow
human beings (349). Literature is for Nussbaum a prime way for exercising this moral
imagination, precisely because it allows for identification, as it “take[s] us into the lives of
those who are different in circumstance from ourselves and enable[s] us to understand.
While it will be clear from the foregoing that Woolf shares some of Nussbaum’s faith in
the powers of  the imagination,  there are other signs in the stories  which indicate a
greater  wariness   of  the  imagination as  well  as  a  comical  undercutting  of  the  moral
powers which Nussbaum takes so seriously. 
21 It is hard, for instance, to ignore the irony in the ‘rubbing-and-twitching fragment’ from
“An Unwritten Novel” quoted before.  The narrator’s excessive identification with her
fellow passenger is clearly mocked and so are, as I have argued, the highly clichéd scenes
she  imagines  for  her.  In  the  story  “Sympathy”  too,  the  capacity  of  the  sympathetic
imagination to inspire compassion for other people is questioned. The narrator seems to
spend all her sympathy in imagining elaborate scenes of mourning for her friend Celia, so
that at the end of her daydreaming, she has no feelings left: “It seems to me that he has
been dead for weeks, for years; when I think of him I see scarcely anything of him, and
that saying about his of liking furniture means nothing at all. And yet he died; the utmost
he could do gives  me now scarcely  any sensation at  all.  Terrible!  Terrible!  to  be  so
callous!” (105). When the narrator subsequently finds out that it was Celia’s father-in-law
who died, not her husband, she even exclaims “O don’t tell me he lives still! O why did
you deceive me?” (105). The sympathetic imagination is here treated with a good dose of
irony and its  results  are clearly not  conducive to what  Nussbaum would call  “moral
behaviour”. 
22 The limitations of the imagination which Woolf highlights in the three Mr. Bennett and
Mrs.  Brown stories  –  its  reliance on set  patterns and clichés,  its  subjectivity and its
inability to penetrate the inner core of the other – of course further detract from the
positive, moral force which Nussbaum claims for it. If the imagination offers only a biased
reading or a partial understanding of the other, it may not present a sound base for a
caring and responsible relationship at all. In “The Lady in the Looking-Glass”, moreover,
Woolf goes even further. Here, the very act of reading – a positive force in the other
stories – is rendered in much more ambiguous terms. We have seen how the narrator,
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dismayed at the realisation that her friend Isabella may have “concealed so much”, is
determined to “prize her open”, to “fix [her] mind upon her”, “to fasten her down” (217).
Similarly, she wants to “catch” Isabella’s inner self, to “penetrate a little farther into her
being” (218). These words are all suggestive of the violence inherent in the act of reading
or knowing the other, as he or she is likely to be defined, placed or “caught” in categories
or clichés.  After all,  as  Woolf  put  it  in “Mr.  Bennett  and Mrs.  Brown”,  aren’t  we all
“uncomfortable […] at travelling with fellow passengers unless [we] have somehow or
other accounted for them?” (1968: 322).
 
Imagination and alterity
23 The critique of the imagination implicit in this use of terms brings Woolf’s conception of
the imagination closer to the poststructuralist take on ethics and reading. In his essay
“Violence et Métaphysique”, Jacques Derrida follows Emmanuel Levinas in his criticism of
Western (moral) philosophy as “egology”, because it invariably tries to reduce the other
to the same. As Levinas points out, “[t]o possess, to know, to grasp are all synonyms of
power” and when the other is thus “possessed, seized, and known”, it is no longer other
(qtd.  Derrida  91).  This  reduction  of  the  “other”  to  the  “same”--with  its  familiar
categories, clichés and norms – is something the sympathetic imagination is also guilty
of. We have seen how Woolf shows this in “Moments of Being” where Fanny projects her
own desires on Julia Craye and in “An Unwritten Novel” where the narrator reduces the
strange woman sitting across from her to a character she knows from popular fiction.
While Nussbaum explicitly defends the compassionate imagination for making us realise
how “different” people have after all but “similar hopes and fears” (349, my italics), Woolf
is clearly much more ambivalent about this reductive quality of the imagination. 
24 As  an  alternative  to  Western  ‘egology’,  Levinas  proposes  an  asymmetrical  ethical
encounter in which the self is placed under a radical imperative by the Other. Levinas’
strictly philosophical ethics of alterity, to which I cannot do full justice here, have been
elaborated in more pragmatic terms by several literary theorists, who have also applied it
to literature. Derek Attridge, for instance, takes up a clear position against Nussbaum
when he argues: 
It is in the acknowledgement of the other human being’s uniqueness and therefore
of the impossibility of finding general rules or schemata to account fully for him or
her  that  one  can  be  said  to  encounter  the  other.  At  the  same time as  it  is  an
affirmation of the other as other, therefore, the experience is an encounter with
the limits of one’s powers to think and to judge, a challenge to one’s capacities as a
rational agent. (24)
25 I would argue that Woolf’s short stories realise some of this “impossibility” or translate
some of this “challenge” in the difficulties and obstacles the imagination encounters in its
attempt to read other people. Each in its own way, the Mr. Bennet and Mrs. Brown stories
show how the imagination is always trying and failing to fully understand the other.
While the stories approve of the curiosity which makes one want to meet the challenge
posed by the other’s otherness, they also show that that challenge can never fully be met.
The hesitations, limitations and, finally, reversals of the narrative imagination in Woolf’s
stories thus bear witness to what Attridge called, “the impossibility of finding general
rules or schemata to account fully for [the other]”. While the attempts to ‘read’ the other
are in themselves laudable, even ethical, they are also doomed to fail. 
The role of the imagination in Virginia Woolf’s short fiction
Journal of the Short Story in English, 50 | 2008
9
26 Yet for Woolf, they fail in reality--not necessarily in art. In the revelatory moment at the
end of  each story,  in fact,  Woolf  seems to reaffirm her faith in the ability of  art  to
temporarily fix or frame the other, or--to put it in more positive terms--to bring the
other to life. Even if the truth reached in these epiphanies is no longer a referential truth,
but the timeless truth of art, the endings of all three stories offer a powerful epiphany
which  seems  to  reassert  the  truth  of  the  imagination  against  the  limitations  first
revealed. In this, I would argue, Woolf essentially differs from thinkers like Attridge or
Derrida. Woolf’s faith in the power of artistic imagination to reveal the truth of (a) life,
even if only momentarily, is a characteristically modernist belief. Attridge’s postmodern
theories,  on  the  contrary,  are  far  more  sceptical  as  they  highlight  the  fundamental
limitations of art, knowledge and the imagination. This difference can also be illustrated
by means of a passage from “Mr. Bennett and Mrs.  Brown” in which Woolf begs her
audience’s tolerance for “the spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary, the failure” of
modern art (1968: 337). For, she argues, this “exhausted and chaotic condition” (335) is
only  temporary:  it  is  due  to  the  modern writers’  attempts  to  break  free  from their
predecessors. Be patient, be supportive, she urges her readers, because unity and truth
will in the end break through, as “we are trembling on the verge of one of the great ages
of English literature” (337). If for the postmodernists “the spasmodic, the obscure, the
fragmentary, the failure” would be fitting emanations of the intrinsic limits of the artistic
and sympathetic imaginations,  for Woolf  these failures and limits are a reality made
bearable by the promise that  they can be overcome.  It  is  this  duality,  finally,  which
Woolf’s  metafictional  short  stories  admirably  capture  as  the  hesitant  and  searching
meanderings of the narrative imagination are – finally, but temporarily – suspended by
the promise of wholeness, fixity and stability of art. 
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NOTES
1.  Oxindine even goes so far as to read Miss Craye’s kiss at the end as a projection of Fanny, but I
am not fully convinced by the textual evidence she gives in support of that interpretation (51). I
will come back to that final scene later on in this essay.
2.  In  an interesting article  on Woolf’s  theory of  the short  story,  Christine Reynier  similarly
argues how “honesty” in Woolf’s theory of fiction does no longer involve “true-to-life details and
the creation of ‘the illusion of reality’”, but rather “inconclusiveness”, “freedom” and “emotional
intensity” (60-61).
3.  In “Modern Fiction” Woolf also praises the Russian writers specifically for their “sympathy for
the sufferings of others” (1966: 109).
4.  I am taking Martha Nussbaum here as an example of a larger strand in ethical criticism, often
called “neo-humanist” or “hermeneutic” criticism (see Harpham 1f.). Richard Rorty and Alisdair
MacIntyre are also representatives of this tradition.
The role of the imagination in Virginia Woolf’s short fiction
Journal of the Short Story in English, 50 | 2008
11
RÉSUMÉS
Cet article étudie la fonction, le pouvoir et la dimension éthique de l'imagination dans quelques
nouvelles  de  Woolf  écrites  à  différents  moments  de  sa  carrière.  Il  montre  que  si  certaines
nouvelles—et certains essais—de Woolf présentent l'imagination comme une force positive dans
le renouvellement de l'art, d'autres soulignent les limites de l'imagination—son recours à des
formes fixes et des clichés, sa subjectivité et son incapacité à pénétrer au cœur de l'autre. En se
plaçant dans une perspective éthique, cet article tente ensuite de cerner la façon dont Woolf
aborde l'imagination et de situer l'auteur dans le débat critique contemporain sur l'éthique et la
littérature. Bien que Woolf, comme, d'une certaine manière, Martha Nussbaum, croie au pouvoir
moral de l'imagination narrative, par sa conscience de la violence potentielle et des limites de
l'imagination, elle se rapproche de la conception post-structuraliste de la critique éthique qu'ont
des  penseurs  tels  que  Jacques  Derrida  et  Derek  Attridge.  Enfin,  cet  article  s'interroge  sur
l'opposition entre l'art et la réalité dans les nouvelles de Woolf consacrées à l'imagination et
conclut que, parce que Woolf continue à croire au pouvoir imaginatif de l'art, son éthique et son
esthétique modernistes ne coïncident pas avec le projet post-moderne de Derrida et Attridge.
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